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1 Introduction
It has been well known for many years that mutual cooperation is a Nash
equilibrium outcome in a two players infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, even though defection is the dominant strategy of the one-shot game
(see e.g the classical book by Axelrod [2]).
In 1980 Smale [13] studied the two players repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game under the assumption that both players have limited memory and only
keep track of the cumulative average payoffs. In this setting, he showed that
a very simple deterministic strategy called a good strategy, if adopted by one
player, leads to cooperation, in the sense that the other player has interest
to cooperate. A good strategy, as defined by Smale, is a strategy such that
the player cooperates unless her average payoff to date is significantly less
than her opponent. Later, Bena¨ım and Hirsch [6] considered the stochastic
analogue of Smale’s solution. In 2005, Bena¨ım Hofbauer and Sorin [7] using
tools from stochastic approximation and differential inclusions showed that
the results of Smale, Bena¨ım and Hirsch can be reinterpreted in the framework
of Blackwell’s approachability theory [9], and that the assumption that ”both”
players keep track only of the cumulative average payoff is unnecessary.
The present paper extends these works to variant of the classical Pris-
oner Dilemma game including N -Players where the underlying structure is
a network. It is based on K. Abhyankar’s PhD thesis [1], Blackwell’s ap-
proachability [9] and the stochastic approximation approach to differential
inclusions developed in [7].
Section 2 sets up the notation and reviews briefly Blackwell’s approacha-
bility and some of the results in [7]. Section 3 considers N -players prisoner
dilemma games and Section 4 prisoner dilemma games in which players are
located at the vertices of a symmetric graph and interact only with their
neighbors. Smale good strategies are defined for these games and are shown
to be Nash equilibria.
2 Notation and Background
Let A and B be two finite sets representing respectively the action sets of
some decision maker DM (for instance a player, or a group of players) and
the action set of Nature (for instance the player’s opponents). Let U : A×B 7→
R
N be a vector valued payoff function.
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Throughout, we let E ⊂ RN denote the convex hull of the payoff vectors
E = conv{U(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
At discrete times n = 1, 2, . . . , DM and Nature choose their actions
(an, bn) ∈ A× B. We assume that:
(a) The sequence {(an, bn)}n≥0 is a random process defined on some proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P) and adapted to some filtration {Fn} (i.e {Fn} is
an increasing family of sub-σ fields of F , and for each n (an, bn) is Fn
measurable). Here Fn has to be understood as the history up to time
n.
(b) Given the history Fn, DM and Nature act independently:
P((an+1, bn+1) = (a, b)|Fn) = P(an+1 = a|Fn)P(bn+1 = b|Fn).
Let P(A) (respectively P(B)) denote the set of probabilities over A (respec-
tively, B.
A (long term) strategy for DM is a stochastic process Θ = {Θn} adapted
to {Fn} taking values in P(A). We say that DM uses strategy Θ if
Θn(a) = P(an+1 = a|Fn) (1)
for all a ∈ A.
The cumulative average payoff at time n is the vector
un =
1
n
n∑
k=1
U(ak, bk) ∈ E. (2)
Strategy Θ is said to be payoff-based provided
Θn(a) = Qun(a)
for all a ∈ A, where for each u ∈ E, Qu(·) is a probability over A and
u ∈ E 7→ Qu ∈ P(A) is measurable. In this case, the family Q = {Qu}u∈E is
identified with DM ’s strategy.
Example 1 (M-Players games) Consider an M-players game with M ≥
2. Players are denoted i = 1, . . . ,M. Player i has a finite action set (or pure
3
strategy set) denoted Σi, and a payoff function U i : Σ1 × . . .×ΣM 7→ RNi for
some Ni ≥ 1.
At each discrete time n = 1, 2, . . . Player i chooses an action sin ∈ Σi and
receives the payoff U i(s1n, . . . , s
M
n ).
Choose DM to be some given subset of players, say I = {1, . . . , k}. Set
A = Σ1 × . . .× Σk, B = Σk+1 × . . .× ΣM
and U : Σ 7→ RN1 × . . .× RN2 ≃ RN , N =∑Mi=1Ni, with
U(a, b) = (U1(a, b), . . . UM (a, b)).
⋄
The Limit Set theorem
Assume that DM has a payoff-based strategy Q. For each u ∈ E let
C(u) =
{ ∑
a∈A,b∈B
U(a, b)Qu(a)ν(b) : ν ∈ P(B)
}
. (3)
The set C(u) is the convex set containing all the average payoffs that are
obtained when DM plays the mixed strategy Qu and Nature plays any mixed
strategy.
Let C ⊂ E × E be the intersection of all closed subset G ⊂ E × E for
which the fiber {y ∈ E : (x, y) ∈ G} is convex and contains C(x). The
closed-convex extension of C, denoted co(C) is defined as
co(C)(x) = {y ∈ E : (x, y) ∈ C}.
For convenience we extend co(C) to a set-valued map co(C) on RN , also
denoted co(C), by setting
co(C)(x) = co(C)(r(x)). (4)
where for all x ∈ RN , r(x) ∈ E denotes the unique point in E closest to x.
Associated to co(C) is the differential inclusion
du
dt
∈ F (u) := −u+ co(C)(u). (5)
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A solution to (5) is an absolutely continuous mapping t 7→ η(t) verifying
η˙(t) ∈ F (η(t)) for almost every t ∈ R. Given such a solution, its initial
condition is the point η(0). Throughout, we let Su ⊂ C0(R,RN) denote the set
of all solutions to (5) with initial condition u. By construction, F maps points
to non empty compact convex sets and has a closed graph. Thus, by standard
results on differential inclusions, Su is a nonempty subset of C
0(R,RN) htat
iscompact (for the topology of uniform convergence on compact intervals) and
(5) induces a set-valued dynamical system Φ = {Φt} defined for all t ∈ R and
u ∈ RN by
Φt(u) = {η(t) : η ∈ Su}.
A set Λ ⊂ RN is said to be invariant for (5) if for all u ∈ Λ there exists η ∈ Su
such that η(R) ⊂ A (see section 3 of [7] for other notions of invariance, more
details and references on set valued dynamics).
A nonempty compact set Λ is called an attracting set for Φ provided there
is some neighborhood U of Λ, called a fundamental neighborhood, with the
property that for every ε > 0 there exists tε > 0 such that Φt(U) ⊂ N ε(Λ)
for all t ≥ tε. Here N ε stands for the ε neighborhood of Λ. If in addition Λ is
invariant, Λ is called an attractor. By Proposition 3.10 in [7], every attracting
set contains an attractor with the same fundamental neighborhood.
The basin of attraction of an attracting set Λ is the set
W(Λ) = {u ∈ RN : ωΦ(u) ⊂ Λ}
where
ωΦ(u) =
⋂
t≥0
Φ[t,∞[(u).
We let
L = L({un})
denote the limit set of the sequence {un} defined by (2). Note that L is a
random subset of E.
Point p ∈ RN is called attainable if for any n ∈ N and any neighborhood
U of p
P(∃m ≥ n : um ∈ U) > 0.
We let Att({un}) denote the set of attainable points.
Parts (i) and (ii) of the following result follow from Theorems 3.6 and 3.23
in [7], generalizing the limit set theorem obtained for stochastic approximation
processes (associated to an ODE) in [3, 4] and asymptotic pseudotrajectories
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(of an ODE) in [5]. Part (iii) follows from [10] generalizing a result obtained
for stochastic approximation processes (associated to an ODE) in [4].
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that DM uses the payoff-based strategy Q. Then with
probability one (regardless of Nature strategy)
(i) L = L({un}) is almost surely an internally chain-transitive set of (5).
(ii) If Λ is an attracting set for Φ then L ⊂ Λ on the event L ∩W(Λ) 6= ∅,
(iii) If Att({un}) ∩W(Λ) 6= ∅ then P(L ⊂ Λ) > 0.
We refer the reader to [7] for the definition of ”internally chain-transitive”
sets since this notion will not be used here but for the fact that an internally
chain-transitive set is compact and invariant under differential inclusions (5).
Approachability
Let d denote the Euclidean distance in RN . A set Λ ⊂ E is said approachable
if there exists a long term strategy for DM such that, regardless of Nature
strategy,
d(un,Λ)→ 0.
Given a compact subset Λ ⊂ E and x ∈ E, define
ΠΛ(x) = {y ∈ Λ : d(x,Λ) = d(x, y)}
where d(x,Λ) = inf{d(x, y) : y ∈ Λ}.
Record that N r(Λ) = {x ∈ E : d(x,Λ) < r}. We say that Λ is a local
B-set for the payoff-based strategy Q (or simply a local B-set) if there exists
r > 0 such that for all x ∈ N r(Λ) \ Λ there exists y ∈ ΠΛ(x) such that the
hyperplane orthogonal to [x, y] at y separates x from C(x). That is,
〈x− y, v − y〉 ≤ 0 (6)
for all v ∈ C(x) as defined by (3). If Λ is a local B-set for all r > 0 it is
simply called a B-set. Blackwell [9], proved that being a B-set is a sufficient
condition for approachability.
Theorem 2.2 Let Λ ⊂ E be a local B-set for the payoff-based strategy Q.
Then
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(i) Λ contains an attractor for Φ with fundamental neighborhood U = N r(Λ).
In particular,
(a) L ⊂ Λ on the event L ∩ U 6= ∅.
(b) Att({un}) ∩ U 6= ∅ ⇒ P({L ⊂ Λ}) > 0.
(ii) If Λ is a B-set, then P(L ⊂ Λ) = 1.
Proof: It is proved in [7], Corollary 5.1 that Λ contains an attractor for
(5) provided inequality (6) holds for all v ∈ co(C)(x) (rather than merely
v ∈ C(x)). It then suffices to prove that (6) also holds for all v ∈ co(C)(x).
Let Graph(C) = {(x, y) ∈ E × E : y ∈ C(x)}. Denote its closure by
Graph(C), and set
Graphx(C) = {y ∈ E : (x, y) ∈ Graph(C)}.
Let D(x) be the convex hull of Graphx(C). It follows from (6) and compact-
ness of Λ that 〈x − y, v − y〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ E, v ∈ Graphx(C) and some
y ∈ ΠΛ(x). Clearly, this inequality still holds for all v ∈ D(x). We claim that
co(C)(x) = D(x) from which the proof of (i) follows.
Proof of the claim: The inclusion D(x) ⊂ co(C)(x) follows from the defi-
nitions. To prove the opposite inclusion it suffices to verify that Graph(D) is
closed. Let xn → x, yn → y with yn ∈ D(xn).
By the Caratheodory Theorem (see e.g Theorem 11.1.8.6 in [8]), the
convex hull of a set G ⊂ RN equates the set obtained by taking all convex
combinations of N + 1 points in G. Thus, there exist
wn = (wn,1, . . . , wn,N+1) ∈ Graphxn(C)N+1
and
αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,N+1) ∈ ∆N (the unit N -dimensional simplex of RN+1)
such that
yn =
N+1∑
i=1
αn,iwn,i.
By compactness, after replacing sequences by subsequences we can assume
that αn → α ∈ ∆N and wn → w. Closedness of Graph(C) ensures that
w ∈ Graphx(C)N+1. Thus y ∈ D(x). This proves the claim.
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Assertions (a) and (b) are now consequences of Theorem 2.1. The lastr
statement was proved by Blackwell [9]. Note that it also follows from (i). ✷
A straightforward application of this last theorem is given by the following
result. It will be used several times in the forthcoming sections.
Let µ ∈ RN with µ 6= 0. For all x ∈ RN , set µ(x) = 〈µ, x〉.
Corollary 2.3 Suppose there exist actions a1, a2 ∈ A and numbers α, β such
that for all b ∈ B
µ(U(a1, b)) ≤ α and µ(U(a2, b)) ≥ β.
Let Q be a payoff-based strategy such that
µ(u) > α⇒ Qu(a1) = 1
and
µ(u) < β ⇒ Qu(a2) = 1.
Then
Λ = {u ∈ E : µ(u) ∈ [α, β]}
is a B−set
Note that there is no assumption here that α ≤ β. If α ≥ β [α, β] stands for
[β, α].
Proof: Equation (6) in this context becomes
µ(u) > α⇒ µ(v) ≤ α
µ(u) < β ⇒ µ(v) ≥ β,
for all u ∈ E, v ∈ C(u). By convexity of the half spaces {µ(v) ≤ α}, {µ(v) ≥
β}, and the definition of Q this is equivalent to the condition given in the
statement of the corollary. ✷
We conclude this section with some quantitative estimates given in the
excellent recent survey paper by Perchet [12]. Let
|E| = sup{‖v‖ : v ∈ E}, |Λ| = sup{‖v‖ : v ∈ Λ}.
The first assertion of the next theorem follows from Corollary 1.1 in [12]. It
is slight variant of a result obtained by Blackwell [9]. The second assertion
follows from Corollary 1.5 in [12].
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Theorem 2.4 Suppose DM adopts the payoff-based strategy Q and that Λ ⊂
E is a B-set for Q. Then for all η > 0
(i)
P(sup
m≥n
d(um,Λ) ≥ η) ≤ 2(|E|+ |Λ|)
2
η2n
.
(ii) If furthermore Λ is convex,
P(sup
m≥n
d(um,Λ)− 2 |E|√
m
≥ η) ≤ 4 exp(− η
2n
32|E|2 ).
3 N-Players Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Consider an N -Players game (as described in Example 1) where each player
has two actions: cooperate C or defect D, so that Σi = {C,D}. We assume
that the payoff functions U i, i = 1, . . .N, are as follows. Let s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈
{C,D}N be the action profile of the players. If Player i cooperates (i.e si = C)
and amongst her N−1 opponents, k cooperate (i.e card{j 6= i : sj = C} = k)
she gets
U i(s) = v(C, k).
If she defects and amongst her opponents, k cooperate she gets
U i(s) = v(D, k).
For k = 0, . . . N − 1 the numbers v(C, k), v(D, k) satisfy the following condi-
tions, usual for prisoner’s dilemmas:
(i) Defection is the dominant action :
v(C, k) < v(D, k)
for all k = 0, . . . , N − 1;
(ii) The payoff of a defector increases with the number of cooperators :
v(D, k) ≤ v(D, k + 1)
for all k = 0, . . . , N − 2;
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(iii) Mutual cooperation is a Pareto optimal: For all s ∈ {C,D}N
N∑
i=1
U i(s) ≤ NU i(C, . . . , C);
Or, equivalently, for all k = 0, . . . , N − 1
kv(C, k − 1) + (N − k)v(D, k) ≤ Nv(C,N − 1).
(iv) (Occasional assumption) Mutual defection is Pareto inefficient: For all
k = 0, . . . , N − 1
kv(C, k − 1) + (N − k)v(D, k) ≥ Nv(D, 0).
Remark 1 Condition (i) makes (D, . . . , D) the unique Nash equilibrium of
the one-shot game.
Remark 2 WhenN = 2 we retrieve the usual two players Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. The Pareto conditions (iii) and (iv) amount to say that the polygon
with vertex set
{(v(D, 0), v(D, 0)); (v(D, 1), v(C, 0)); (v(C, 0), v(D, 1)); (v(C, 1), v(C, 1))}
is convex.
Example 2 (Free riding) Let f : {0, . . . , N} 7→ R+ and c > 0 be such that
c
N
≤ f(k + 1)− f(k) < c.
Let
v(C, k) = f(k + 1)− c and v(D, k) = f(k).
This can be seen as a simple model of ”free riding”. Each player can either
Contribute (Cooperate), or Defect from contributing, to a public good. In-
dividual contribution costs c and everyone -even if a defector- benefits from
the good and is paid f(k), when there are k contributors.
Note that the assumption on f imply that conditions (i)− (iv) above are
satisfied. The fact that mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
game is reminiscent of Hardin’s book The Tragedy of the Commons [11].
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⋄Recall that E = conv{U(s) : s ∈ {C,D}N}. For u = (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ E let
µi(u) = ui − 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
uj =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1
(ui − uj).
Let δ be a nonnegative real number, Adapting [13], [6] and [7], we define a
δ-good strategy for Player i as a payoff-based strategy Qi (as defined in section
2) for the Decision Maker, Player i, such that
Qiu(C) = 1 if µ
i(u) ≥ 0,
and
Qiu(D) = 1 if µ
i(u) < −δ.
We call such a strategy continuous whenever the map u 7→ Qu is continuous.
The following result shows that, by playing a δ-good strategy, a player
(or a group of players) makes sure that her opponents’average payoff cannot
be much better than hers, nor than the Pareto optimal payoff. Under the
supplementary condition (iv) she ensures that her payoff cannot be much
worse that the payoff resulting from mutual defection. If furthermore, all the
players play a δ-good strategy, one of them being continuous, the outcome
is the one given by mutual cooperation. As a consequence (Corollary 3.2),
continuous δ-good strategies form a Nash equilibrium. The proof is postponed
to the end of the section.
Theorem 3.1 Let k ≤ N. Suppose that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} Player i plays
a δ-good strategy. Let
u−kn =
1
N − k
N∑
j=k+1
ujn
be the average payoff to players k + 1, . . . , N . Then
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(i) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
0 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
u−kn − uin ≤ lim sup
n→∞
u−kn − uin ≤
N − 1
N − k δ,
lim sup
n→∞
uin ≤ v(C,N − 1),
and, if mutual defection is inefficient,
lim inf
n→∞
uin ≥ v(D, 0)− δ.
(ii) Suppose k = N . Then:
(a)
L({un}) ⊂ diag(E) = {u ∈ E : u1 = . . . = uN},
and if at least one of the players uses a continuous δ-good strategy,
then
(b)
lim
n→∞
un = U(C, . . . , C) = (v(C,N − 1), . . . v(C,N − 1)).
Let ε > 0. Let Θi be a strategy (as defined by equation (1)) for Player i.
The strategy profile (Θ1, . . . ,ΘN) is called an ε-Nash equilibrium if for
every i and every alternative strategy Ξi for i, the payoff to i resulting from
(Θ1, . . . ,Θi−1,Ξi,Θi+1, . . . ,ΘN) cannot be ε better than the payoff resulting
from (Θ1, . . . ,ΘN). More precisely:
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, every strategy Ξi and every Σ×Σ-valued process
{(sn, s˜n)} adapted to the filtration {Fn} satisfying
P(sn+1 = s|Fn) =
N∏
j=1
Θjn(s
j),
and
P(sn+1 = s|Fn) =
(∏
j 6=i
Θin(s
j)
)
Ξin(s
i);
then
P(lim sup
n→∞
u˜in ≤ lim inf
n→∞
uin + ε) = 1.
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Here
un =
1
n
n∑
k=1
U(sk), u˜n =
1
n
n∑
k=1
U(s˜k).
In other words, if all players but i play the equilibrium strategy, Player i
cannot improve his payoff by more than ε if he deviates from Θi.
Corollary 3.2 Let δ > 0. Suppose that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} Qi is a contin-
uous δ-good strategy. Then (Q1, . . . , QN) is a δ(N − 1)-Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Follows from Theorem 3.1 ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.1
For all δ ≥ 0 let
Λi(δ) = {u ∈ E : −δ ≤ µi(u) ≤ 0}.
Proposition 3.3 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Suppose that i plays a δ-good strategy
Qi. Then Λi(δ) is a B-set for Qi. In particular, assertion (ii) of Theorem 2.2
and Theorem 2.4 hold.
Proof: Suppose i = 1. Given s−1 = (s2, . . . , sN) ∈ {C,D}N−1, let k =
card{j > 1 : sj = C}. Then
µ1(U(C, s−1)) =
N − (k + 1)
N − 1 (v(C, k)− v(D, k + 1)) ≤ 0
and
µ1(U(D, s−1)) =
k
N − 1(v(D, k)− v(C, k − 1)) ≥ 0.
By Corollary 2.3 and definition of Q1, this concludes the proof. ✷
Proposition 3.4 (Properties of {Λi(δ)}) For all δ ≥ 0 the sets Λi(δ) sat-
isfy the following properties:
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(i) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and u ∈ Λi(δ)
ui ≤ v(C,N − 1),
and, if mutual defection is Pareto inefficient,
ui ≥ v(D, 0)− δ.
(ii) For all k ≤ N, u ∈ ⋂i∈{1,...,k}Λi(δ) and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
0 ≤
∑N
j=k+1 uj
N − k − ui ≤ δ
N − 1
N − k
(iii) ⋂
i∈{1,...,N}
Λi(δ) = diag(E) = {u ∈ E : u1 = . . . = uN}.
Proof: Suppose i = 1. For all η ∈ R let Πη be the orthogonal projection
onto the hyperplan {µ1(u) = η}. Then
Πη(u) = u− (µ
1(u)− η
‖µ1‖2 )µ
1
where µ1 is the vector defined by µ1(u) = 〈µ1, u〉. That is µ1 = (µ1i )i=1,...,N
with µ11 = 1 and µ
1
i = − 1N−1 for i > 1. It follows that
Πη1(u) = u1 −
µ1(u)− η
‖µ1‖2 =
∑N
i=1 ui
N
+ η
N − 1
N
.
Thus, by Pareto dominance of v(C,N − 1)
Πη1(u) ≤ v(C,N − 1) + η
for all u = U(s), hence for all u ∈ E. Let now u ∈ Λ1. Then u = Πη(u) with
η = µ1(u) ∈ [−δ, 0]. Thus u1 ≤ v(C,N − 1). Similarly, if v(D, 0) is inefficient,
then u1 ≥ v(D, 0)− δN−1N .
To prove the second assertion set A =
∑k
j=1 uj, B =
∑
j>k uj and note
that, by definition of Λi(δ)
−(N − 1)δ ≤ Nui −A−B ≤ 0
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for all i = 1, . . . , k. Thus, by summing over all i = 1, . . . , k,
−(N − 1)kδ ≤ (N − k)A− kB ≤ 0.
Then
Nui ≤ A +B ≤ kB
N − k +B =
NB
N − k
and
Nui ≥ A+B−(N−1)δ ≥ k(B − δ(N − 1))
N − k +(B−(N−1)δ) =
N(B − (N − 1)δ)
N − k .
The last assertion is immediate, because on Λi(δ) Nui ≤
∑
j uj. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Assertion (i) and the beginning of (ii) follow from
Propositions 3.3 and 3.4. It remains to prove the last assertion. Assume that
Player 1 uses a continuous strategy. Recall that C1(x) is defined by (3) with
Q = Q1. By continuity of x 7→ Q1x the map x 7→ C1(x) has a closed graph
so that co(C)1(x) = C1(x) for all x ∈ E. Thus, by Theorem 2.1 (i), the set
L = L({un}) is invariant under the differential inclusion
u˙ ∈ −u+ C1(u) (7)
and, by what precedes, is contained in diag(E). In particular, for all u ∈ L
there exists η solution to (7) such that η(0) = u and µ1(η(t)) = 0 for all t.
Let h(t) = η(t) + η˙(t). Then µ1(h(t)) = 0 and h(t) ∈ C1(η(t)) for almost all
t. Let v∗ = U(C, . . . , C) = (v(C,N − 1), . . . , v(C,N − 1)).
By definition of Q1 and C1,
µ1(u) ≥ 0⇒ C1(u) = conv{U(C, s−1) : s−1 ∈ {C,D}N−1}.
Now, the proof of Theorem 3.3 shows that µ1(U(C, s−1) ≤ 0 with equality
only if s = (C, . . . , C). Thus
µ1(u) ≥ 0⇒ {v ∈ C1(u) : µ1(v) = 0} = {v∗}.
This implies that h(t) = v∗ and η(t) = e−t(u − v∗) + v∗ for all t ∈ R.
By compactness of L we must have u = v∗ (for otherwise {η(t)} would be
unbounded).
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4 Network Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Network Games
In this section we consider a game in which players are located at the vertices
of a graph and interact only with their neighbors. There are M players de-
noted i = 1, . . . ,M. Player i has a finite action set Σi. The set V = {1, . . . ,M}
of vertices of the graph is equipped with an edge set E ⊂ V × V.
We assume that the graph (V, E) is
(a) symmetric: (i, j) ∈ E ⇒ (j, i) ∈ E ,
(b) self-loop free: (i, i) 6∈ E , and
(c) irreducible: for all i, j ∈ V there exist k ≥ 1 and i1, . . . , ik ∈ V such that
i1 = 1, ik = j and (il, il+1) ∈ E for l = 1, . . . , k − 1.
For each (i, j) ∈ E there is a real valued map
U ij : Σi × Σj 7→ R
representing the payoff function to Player i against Player j.
Let Neigh(i) = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E} and let Ni be its cardinal. The payoff
function to i is the map U i : Σ 7→ RNi defined by
U i(s) = (U ij(si, sj))j∈Neigh(i).
Using the notation of Example 1, set N =
∑M
i=1Ni, and define the vector
payoff function of the game as
U = (U1, . . . , UM) : Σ 7→ RN1 × . . .× RNm ≃ RN .
The state space of the game is then E = conv{U(s), s ∈ Σ} ⊂ RN .
In addition to these data, we assume given a Markov transition matrix
K = (Kij)i,j∈V adapted to (V, E). That is
Kij ≥ 0,
∑
j
Kij = 1
and
Kij > 0⇔ (i, j) ∈ E .
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The mean payoff to Player i for the strategy profile s is defined as
U
i
(s) =
∑
j
KijU
ij(s). (8)
Irreducibility of the graph (V, E) ensures irreducibility of the transition matrix
K. Therefore there is a unique invariant probability pi for K. That is,
pii ≥ 0,
∑
i
pii = 1
and for all i ∈ V ∑
j
pijKji = pii.
Define the weight of edge (i, j) ∈ E as
ωij = piiKij. (9)
Such weights will prove to be useful for defining δ-good strategies below. Note
that, by invariance of pi, ∑
j
ωij =
∑
j
ωji = pii (10)
Example 3 Suppose
Kij =
{
1
Ni
if j ∈ Neigh(i)
0 if j 6∈ Neigh(i)
Then
U
i
(s) =
∑
j∈Neigh(i) U
ij(s)
Ni
,
pii =
Ni
N
and ωij =
1
N
1j∈Neigh(i).
⋄
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Network Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
We consider now a particular example of network games where each pair of
neighboring players is engaged in two players prisoner dilemma game. We
assume that for each i ∈ V Σi = {C,D}, and
U ij(C,D) = CD, . . . , U ij(D,C) = DC,
where
(i)
CD < DD < CC < DC
as usual for the two player prisoner’s dilemma game.
(ii) We furthermore assume that the outcome CC is Pareto optimal and that
the outcome DD is Pareto inneficient, in the sense that for all (i, j) ∈ E
(ωij + ωji)DD < ωijCD + ωjiDC < (ωij + ωji)CC;
Remark 3 If K is reversible with respect to pi (meaning that ωij = ωji) as
in Example 3, Pareto inefficiency means
2DD < CD +DC < 2CC.
Equivalently, the polygon with vertices
(DD,DD), (CD,DC), (DC,CD), (CC,CC)
is convex and hence equal to E.
For u = (uij)i∈V,j∈Neigh(i) ∈ RN1 × . . .× RNm
let
µi(u) =
∑
j
ωijuij − ωjiuji.
Given δ ≥ 0, a δ-good strategy for Player i is a payoff-based strategy Qi such
that
Qiu(C) = 1 if µ
i(u) ≥ 0,
and
Qiu(D) = 1 if µ
i(u) < −δ.
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The following result is similar to Theorem 3.1. It shows that if a group
of players use δ-good strategies, their payoffs cannot be much worse that the
payoff resulting from mutual defection and that a weighted average of the
other players payoffs cannot be much better than hers. If furthermore, all
the players play a δ-good strategy, and that of player i is continuous, then
the payoffs of i against j and j against i both equal CC, given by mutual
cooperation.
As a consequence (Corollary 4.2), continuous δ-good strategies form a
Nash equilibrium. The proof is postponed to the end of the section.
Theorem 4.1 Assume 1 ≤ k ≤ N. Suppose that for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Player i
plays a δ-good strategy. Then
(i)
L({un}) ⊂
⋂
i∈{1,...,k}
Λi(δ).
(ii)
DD − δ
2pii
≤ lim inf
n→∞
uin ≤ lim sup
n→∞
uin ≤ CC, (i = 1, . . . , k).
(iii)
N∑
j=k+1
pijDD ≤ lim inf
n→∞
N∑
j=k+1
piju
j
n ≤ lim sup
n→∞
N∑
j=k+1
piju
j
n ≤
N∑
j=k+1
pijCC+
kδ
2
.
(iv) If k = N and Player l uses a continuous δ-good strategy, then for all
j ∈ Neigh(l)
lim
n→∞
uljn = lim
n→∞
ujln = CC
Corollary 4.2 Let δ > 0. Suppose that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} Qi is a contin-
uous δ-good strategy. Then (Q1, . . . , QN) is a (N−1)δ
2
Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4.1
For all δ ≥ 0 let
Λi(δ) = {u ∈ E : −δ ≤ µi(u) ≤ 0}.
19
Proposition 4.3 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Assume that i plays a δ-good strategy
Qi. Then Λi(δ) is a B-set for Qi.
Proof: Fix i ∈ V. Let s = (s1, . . . , sM) ∈ Σ1× . . .×ΣM be such that si = C.
Then
µi(U(s)) =
∑
j
ωij(CCtj + CD(1− tj))−
∑
j
ωji(CCtj +DC(1− tj)))
where tj = 1 if s
j = C and 0 otherwise. Thus
µi(U(s)) =
∑
j
ωijtj(CC−CD)+
∑
j
ωjitj(DC−CC)+CD
∑
j
ωij−DC
∑
j
ωji
≤
∑
j
ωij(CC − CD) +
∑
j
ωji(DC − CC) + CD
∑
j
ωij −DC
∑
j
ωji
= pii(CC − CD +DC − CC + CD −DC) = 0.
Suppose now that si = D. Then
µi(U(s)) =
∑
j
ωij(DCtj +DD(1− tj))−
∑
j
ωji(CDtj +DD(1− tj)))
=
∑
j
ωijtj(DC −DD) +
∑
j
ωjitj(DD − CD) ≥ 0.
The results then follows from Corollary 2.3. ✷
Remark 4 the proof above shows that µi(U(s)) < 0 (respectively > 0) if
si = C (resp. D) and sj = D (resp. C) for some j 6= i
Proposition 4.4 (Properties of {Λi(δ)}) For all δ ≥ 0 the sets {Λi(δ)}
verify the following properties:
(i) For i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and u ∈ Λi(δ) set ui =
∑
j Kijuij. Then
DD − δ
2pii
≤ ui ≤ CC.
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(ii) For all k < N and u ∈ ⋂kj=1Λj(δ)
0 ≤
N∑
i=k+1
µi(u) ≤ kδ,
(
N∑
i=k+1
pii)DD ≤
N∑
i=k+1
piiui ≤ (
N∑
i=k+1
pii)CC +
kδ
2
(iii) ⋂
i∈{1,...,N}
Λi(δ) =
⋂
i∈{1,...,N}
Λi(0)
Proof: (i). Let v ∈ RN be the vector defined by vij = 1, vji = −1 for all
j ∈ Neigh(i) and vkl = 0 if k 6= i, l 6= i or (k, l) 6∈ E . Let Πη be the projection
onto the hyperplan {µi(u) = η} parallel to v. That is
Πη(u) = u− µ
i(u)− η
µi(v)
v = u− µ
i(u)− η
2pii
v.
Thus, for all s ∈ Σ
∑
j
ωijΠ
η(U(s))ij =
∑
j(ωijU
ij(s) + ωjiU
ji(s)) + η
2
≤
∑
j(ωij + ωji)CC + η
2
= piiCC +
η
2
, (11)
≥
∑
j(ωij + ωji)DD + η
2
= piiDD +
η
2
(12)
where the last inequalities follow from Pareto dominance. This implies that
for all u ∈ E
DD
η
2pii
≤
∑
j
KijΠ
η(u)ij =
1
pii
∑
j
ωijΠ
η(u)ij ≤ CC + η
2pii
.
Hence for all u ∈ Λi
DD − δ
2pii
≤
∑
j
Kijuij ≤ CC.
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(ii). Note that∑
j
µj(u) =
∑
j
∑
k
ωjkujk − ωkjukj =
∑
k
∑
j
ωjkujk − ωkjukj = −
∑
j
µj(u).
Thus,
∑
j µ
j(u) = 0 and the inequalities follow from the definition of Λj(δ)
for the first one and inequalities (11, 12) for the second one.
(iii). Let u ∈ ⋂Λj(δ). Then µi(u) ≤ 0 for all i, but since ∑i µi(u) = 0,
µi(u) = 0. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.1 The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Assertion (i), (ii) and (iii) follow from Propositions 4.3 and 4.4. For (iv) we
use the fact that if player 1 plays a continuous δ good strategy, then the limit
set L of {un} is an invariant set of the differential inclusion u˙ ∈ −u + C1(u)
contained in
⋂
Λi(0). By proposition 4.3 and remark 4, for all u ∈ ⋂iΛi(0)
and v ∈ C1(u) u1j = uj1 = CC. Thus, reasoning like in the proof of Theorem
3.1, invariance of L shows that for all u ∈ L u1j = uj1 = CC.
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